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Abstract  
Spanish victims groups have provided a visible contribution to European terrorist violence 
prevention  efforts. Instrumental and knowledge transfer motivations partly explain this interest 
but a separate driver that requires more attention is their opposition to the international narrative 
that legitimises ETAs violence promulgated by the political movement of the Basque Patriotic 
Left. This has resulted in a ‘battle of narratives’ played out at the international level in order to 
shape the future of Basque politics where victims are challenging a discourse that frames the past 
in a way that justifies terrorism and that leaves the door open to a future return to violence.  
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Introduction  
Governments increasingly understand that a crucial element in both the response to and the 
prevention of terrorism is the need to confront the narratives espoused by militants.
1
 These sets 
of interrelated stories are ‘powerful resources for influencing target audiences [...]which can be 
used to interpret and frame local events and to strategically encourage particular kinds of 
personal action’.2 Narratives are seen as part of the process of radicalisation due to their ability to 
frame local, national and global events in a simplistic in-group-outgroup dichotomy drawing on 
the notions of victimisation and grievance. Furthermore, given that the narratives emerging from 
radical organisations offer a solution to this victimisation through violent action, reinforced by 
sophisticated religious and moral justifications for violence, they serve as stirring and compelling 
messages that resonate among potential terrorist recruits.  
It is argued that effectively fighting the appeal of these messages requires the crafting of both 
counter-narratives and alternative narratives.
3
 The former are attempts at refuting the rhetoric 
that groups such as ISIS or Al-Qaeda construct to justify their actions and the latter are 
understood either as alternative explanations for the grievances leveraged in violent propaganda 
or as messages that espouse opposite values and norms to the ones adopted by violent extremists 
(i.e. tolerance, plurality, democracy, respect for human rights…). Government, community 
groups, human rights NGOs, religious organisations and special interest groups all play a role in 
the construction and delivery of alternative and counter narratives, some more visibly than 
others.  
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One community is increasingly active in this fight against violent extremism; this community is 
comprised of the survivors and the families of victims of terrorism. The origins of the 
involvement of families and survivors in countering violent extremism (CVE) is the belief that 
victims’ testimonies can act as moral counter-narratives ‘by exposing the immorality of killing in 
the name of a political cause’. In addition, testimonies can provide alternative narratives given 
that these testimonies, as exemplars of adherence to the rule of law and can demonstrate the 
‘promot[ion of] democratic values and resilience’.4 Crucially victims’ testimonies are based on 
real lived experience and may influence an audience based on their potential empathic appeal. 
Through their stories, victims can, in other words, ‘make a powerful contribution to the 
awareness of the danger and effects of radicalisation and terrorism. Victims can share their 
experience with a broader public, creating a story that people can relate to.’5 Such testimonies 
can play a vital role primarily due to the strength of the moral message being transmitted in the 
recalling of their personal tragedy, but also due to the credibility and trust-worthiness of the 
messenger as an innocent victim of terrorism.  
Although it is easily understood why political actors aim to involve victims of terrorism in 
counter-narrative work, it is less apparent why victims groups themselves would want to be part 
of international counter-radicalisation efforts, especially those who represent survivors of 
domestic terrorism. In those cases, given that victims’ views on violence are irremediably shaped 
by the context from which it emerges
6
 and that the audience they seek to engage with is domestic 
–and, in certain contexts, a divided society-, a number of interesting questions arise. Questions 
such as: What moves these organisations to act at the international (as opposed to the domestic) 
level in violence prevention and CVE measures? What has been their contribution and how do 
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they see their work making a difference? Who is their audience? And to what extent it is possible 
to assess the potential effectiveness of their activities? 
In an effort to address some of these issues, this article focuses on the experience of Spanish 
victims groups. The Spanish case is interesting because despite the emergence of two important 
organisations following the March, 11, 2004 (11-M) Atocha attacks
7
, victims’ associations were 
born and grew mainly as a reaction to campaigns waged by domestic groups (primarily the 
Basque militant organisation ETA). As we will see, however, Spanish victims’ groups have 
carried out significant work on violent prevention in the international arena. In trying to explain 
this apparent contradiction, this article is structured in the following manner: firstly it will 
account for the international activities carried out by Spanish victims groups and related political 
foundations. Subsequently it will examine the rationale behind these groups’ international 
activities and finally address the impact of and existing challenges to this work.  
The two main methods employed to address the questions mentioned above were documentary 
analysis of material generated by victims groups and semi-structured interviews with 
representatives of seven victims associations and political organisations with an interest in 
victims’ issues.8 The sample was selected following an initial analysis of media and academic 
sources and exchanges with other experts in this area.
9
  
International preventative action 
What quickly emerged during the fieldwork conducted for this paper was the fact that 
international action -that is to say, activism carried out at the international level- is conducted by 
relatively few victims organisations in Spain. Overwhelmingly, Spanish victims associations 
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have focused on the local, regional and national spheres. Moreover, the international work that is 
currently underway began relatively recently; the majority of these organisations were 
established during the 1990s or earlier, but international work started only in the mid-2000s.
10
  
It must also be noted that the international activism of victims associations’ has not been directed 
entirely towards the prevention of violent extremism. Activism at the international level seeks to 
pursue a variety of goals: the promotion of the legal rights of victims of terrorism, the creation of 
international structures of support for victims, ensuring recognition for victims as a distinct 
political community, as well as seeking the development of an international statute for victims of 
terrorism while lobbying for terrorism to be considered a crime against humanity.
11
 
Looking more specifically at the field of prevention of terrorism, Spanish victims’ groups have 
prioritised the dissemination of testimonies to the widest possible audience. This process aims to 
fulfil psychological, political and social functions for the group members. First and foremost, 
telling their own life stories is perceived as a cathartic process for the victims themselves and is 
in many cases seen as a measure that can support their personal recovery.
12
 In addition, giving 
voice to victims and their families ensures the memory of their loss is publicly acknowledged, a 
key aim of many Spanish victims’ organisations. Equally, these stories fulfil other important 
social goals: they raise awareness about the victims’ experiences and highlight their existence as 
a coherent community, they provide a focus for joint action and they create an oral history of the 
impact of terrorism. As a record of history, these testimonies act as an alternative to (and an 
enhancement of) the politicised government and paramilitary rhetoric surrounding terrorism; in 
effect they personalise the story of the violence and put the victims at the centre of the narrative. 
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Victims’ organisations do therefore regard these stories as an important element of their narrative 
against violent extremism.  
As mentioned Spanish victims’ organisations work hard to ensure that the testimonies of victims 
reach a wide audience, nationally and globally. English translations of interviews with victims of 
terrorism have been –or are in the process of being - added to the webpages of some of these 
groups. For instance the Fundación Fernando Buesa and the former Basque peace organisation 
Bakeaz, included translated testimonies on the online platform ‘Zoomrights’13also the Fundación 
Gregorio Ordoñez has translated parts of their online audio-visual archives.
14
 Furthermore, many 
testimonies are shared with partner organisations in Europe
15
, presented at international 
conferences and workshops and distributed via media outlets globally. For example at the 2014 
Global counter-terrorism forum in Abu Dhabi COVITE presented the findings of the project ‘El 
Mapa del Terror- The Map of Terror’ an online platform that documents the events surrounding 
the more than 600 terrorist killings committed in Basque Country between 1960 and 2010. 
COVITE has described the online platform as a mechanism to keep the memory of the victims 
alive and to challenge the voices that support political violence now and in the past.
16
 
Another effective way of attracting international attention to their cause has been through 
cultural initiatives in the hope that the experiences of the victims of terrorism in Spain can be 
conveyed without the need for a shared language and that the visual impact of these images 
raises awareness amongst young people.
17
An especially fitting example is the ‘Europa contra el 
terrorismo. La mirada de la víctima / Europe against terrorism. Glance of the victim’, the first 
European photographic exhibition focused on the experiences of victims of terrorism. Organised 
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by Fundación Miguel Angel Blanco in partnership with the Association Francaise des Victimes 
du Terrorisme and the Associazione Italiana Vittime del Terrorismo, the project ‘[brings] the 
glance of the victims as an agent of social awareness and deradicalisation and [helps to] build the 
memory of European terrorism victims in their search for justice’.18 
In addition to their own individual initiatives, Spanish victims associations have participated in 
international schemes run by other actors. This includes TerRa, a platform funded by the 
European Commission for the exchange of best practices and provision of guidance to 
practitioners throughout the EU in order to ‘reinforce the positive role victims and former 
terrorists can play in relation to the prevention of radicalisation’.19 The target groups include 
journalists, police officers, government officials, religious leaders and NGOs staff. Indeed, the 
Association to Help the Victims of March 11
th




With a similar remit of facilitating the exchange of knowledge between and amongst academics, 
practitioners, governments and NGOs, the European Commission’s Radicalisation Awareness 
Network is also an important forum for Spanish victims’ groups. The aim of the RAN is ‘to stop 
people from getting involved in violent extremist or terrorist activities in the first place, or to 
convince them to turn away from such ideas and methods’.21 
Most relevant is the work of the RAN unit labelled ‘Remembrance  of Victims of Terrorism 
(RVT) Working Group’. The goal of RVT is ‘to maintain the network of organisations of victims 
of terrorism and to organise remembrance ceremonies’ and more relevant to the matter at hand, 
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‘transmit the voices of the victims of terrorism as part of prevention efforts to counter 
radicalisation’.22 
Importantly, Spanish groups such as the AAVV11M, FVT, FMAB or COVITE have had a 
presence at the VVT -most often to display the results from particular initiatives
23
- and the 
Asociación de Victimas del Terrorismo (AVT) is a RAN permanent member, even if by their 
own admission they have not had a continuous participation due to staff shortages.
24
 The groups 
who participated in this study have a broadly positive (but not uncritical) opinion of the RAN. 
One of its greatest strengths is said to be that it involves individuals from different spheres: 
policymakers, academics and practitioners. Another positive feature is that it helps to bring 
different European victims’ groups together and to build a network of contacts. This strengthens 
the ties of solidarity and can potentially lay the foundations for closer collaboration between 
European groups. 
Explaining international action 
When explaining the rationale behind the Spanish victims organisations international violence 
prevention efforts it is useful to start by referring to Hoffman and Kasupski’s important 
distinction between victims associations focused on assisting, informing and supporting the 
recovery process of survivors and families, and those that prioritise influencing public policy.
25
 
Most victims organisations in Spain either fall under the first category or follow both objectives. 
The minority who concentrate solely on advocacy and lobbying are generally political 
foundations named after a high-profile victim who are concerned with a range of issues in 
addition to the protection of the rights of victims of terrorism. Because they work in the defence 
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of human rights, democratic values and/or a culture of peace, they have naturally gravitated to 
international efforts toward preventing violent extremism. So it is not surprising to find these 
category of organisations over-represented in this work.  However, it must be noted that the 
boundaries between these two categories can become blurred as victims’ groups have also 
occasionally collaborated in the past in initiatives related to the promotion of peace and 
reconciliation in addition to their work meeting victims’ individual needs.  
Hence the organisation’s original aims are a good predictor of involvement in international 
preventative action. This is evidenced by the fact that the AVT –by far the largest association in 
the country- has a lesser international profile than one might expect given their predominant 
position within the Spanish victims’ community. As was explained to this researcher, this comes 
down to the fact that while the AVT has acted internationally, their focus remains fixed on 
providing individual assistance (psychological, medical, financial) to victims at the domestic 
level. 
For advocacy groups having a recognisable international CVE presence or not comes down to 
whether this area of activity is prioritised by the group’s leadership. This is confirmed in the case 
of COVITE, an activist Basque terrorism victims organisation. As an important change in their 
strategic direction, COVITE recently began to emphasise the international dimension of their 
counter-radicalisation work and it is now one of the most active Spanish organisations at this 
level.    
Nonetheless, even for those groups who have worked in international CVE campaigns, the 
national setting still takes precedence and it is viewed as the most important venue for these 
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efforts. In fact one the main findings from this research is that a common motivator for their 
international work is the drive to confront narratives that glorify and romanticise ETAs violence. 
As will be later explained, challenging pro-ETA international discourses in order to prevent 
potential future violence is neither a short-term endeavour nor especially relevant to other 
international contexts. In contrast, its impact would be mostly local, felt in the Basque context 
alone.  
Before we discuss this theme, it should be noted that Spain has experienced many forms of 
terrorist violence over the past four decades. The majority of the Spanish victims in this period 
result from ETA’s ethno-nationalist campaign of violence26, but a sizeable minority were created 
by jihadist, extreme right, radical left and state acts of terrorism. Clearly public authorities, non-
governmental organisations and civil society more broadly, have amassed much expertise in 
dealing with politically motivated violence. Victims’ representatives themselves were eager to 
share the accumulated repository of knowledge gathered over the years: 
‘Unfortunately terrorism is a phenomenon that is globalised. Therefore our goal is to contribute 
with the experience we have from all we lived through in Spain and thanks to the professional 
background by our own staff I believe we have much to contribute in Europe. Unfortunately, we 
have an experience that other countries don’t have’27 
There is an expectation amongst victims’ organisations in Spain that the hard learned lessons and 
the pioneering work the groups have carried out should be seen as relevant in the case of jihadist 
radicalisation and terrorism  
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‘This is the work we are carrying out: to ride the coattails and to contribute in the fight against 
radical islamism but always leveraging the experience that unfortunately this country has on the 
fight against radicalisation’ 28 
A firmly-held belief is that the Spanish experience might serve to transmit the message to others 
that violence is both costly and ineffectual and that civil society can react to the terror challenge 
through non-violence and respect for the rule of law and democratic values:    
‘[we] have as a goal to prevent radicalisation within international society in order to pre-empt 
future hotspots of violence and radicalisation. [..] Therefore, [we] promote the transmission of 
democratic and constitutional values. Victims of terrorism through different activities bring to 
the most vulnerable [to radicalisation] sectors in society the principles of non revenge, of not 
turning to hate but to advance the respect for the rule of law.’29 
In essence, for the participants in this study, the outcome of the Basque experience is seen as an 
ethical and pedagogical model that can inform responses to terrorism in other contexts. At the 
same time, other participants recognise that the process must be bi-directional as the reciprocal 
sharing of best practises could help Spain to confront its own problem of extremist radicalisation:   
‘our message could be beneficial to strengthen ties, to collaborate, not only to contribute but 
also to learn because Europe in other areas and historical contexts has suffered terrorism and 
we also need to learn from the experiences in other contexts [..] ’30 
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In sum, representatives from the participant groups appreciate the opportunity to disseminate 
their own extensive experience in preventing radicalisation but also to learn from the experiences 
of others in leveraging victims’ testimonies for the broader benefits to society.  
Alternatively, there are instrumental and organisational reasons behind these groups’ decisions to 
move into the international arena that relate to the severe economic crisis that has affected the 
country since 2008 and has had a serious negative impact on the groups’ finances. In practice 
victims associations in Spain rely for most of their work on public subsidies from either local, 
regional or national authorities, and the severe cuts have forced many to reduce their budget, 
slash costs, downsize, and/or seek other funding sources. Some organisations have even been 
forced to call on their members’ support for their survival.31 As a result many groups have 
greatly reduced their levels of activity and a majority now rely on the work of unpaid interns and 
volunteers. A few presently find themselves inactive, in ‘stand-by’ or seriously considering 
closure.   
Therefore, in the current environment, participation in international initiatives has the potential to 
sustain the organisations’ visibility, which can also be potentially translated into a funding 
lifeline. However, even though the groups find themselves in a precarious financial position, , the 
connection between this situation and their motivation to participate in or lead international 
projects funded by international bodies went unsaid.  
What it is explicitly recognised more often however is that ETA’s definitive ceasefire declared in 
2011 has aggravated this funding crisis since vigorous social opposition to terrorism has quite 
predictably become a lower priority for the Spanish government. So, as a reaction to ETA’s 
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indefinite ceasefire, some actors-such as the renowned peace organisation Gesto por la Paz- have 
opted to dissolve, whereas victims associations have remained active, chiefly because they 
consider the psychological and financial support for the victims as a long-term goal. For the 
groups whose agenda is focused on policy reform however, ETA’s slow end and the fact that, 
following decades of advocacy work, victims now finally enjoy political recognition of their 
rights, mean that the priorities of the organisation need to change in order to remain relevant in 
this new political climate. So shifting attention towards the delegitimisation of violence, 
reconciliation and the strengthening of a peace culture becomes an obvious strategic choice. So 
for victims’ groups, given this change in political context, we have witnessed a reorientation of 
priorities and, for some, a growing involvement with international peace work: 
‘it is true that following ETAs definitive ceasefire in 2011, the scenario changes and we are 
forced to work in the field of the prevention of radicalisation in addition to all the other areas we 
were already working on: memory, justice and dignity’32 
On balance however, one of the most important motivators for victims’ groups continues to be 
domestic politics. That is, a fundamental factor explaining these groups move towards 
international activism is the need to confront the narratives promoted abroad by the Izquierda 
Abertzale (the Basque Patriotic Left, henceforth BPL), the socio-political movement that share a 
common root with ETA. The Basque Patriotic Left comprises of a number of heterogeneous 
political organisations; political parties, a trade union, youth groups and a network of 
organisations superficially devoted to social issues (i.e. feminism, environmental, social justice 
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Similar to ETA, their political goal is to achieve independence for the Basque Country. 
Regardless, not all these actors have always fully agreed with ETA about the strategic utility of 
violence or its targets. Hence, although for decades the BPL was represented by the political 
party Herri Batasuna (Popular Unity), since 2011 their former members and voters coalesced 
around Sortu (To Create) which is part of Bildu (To Build), a coalition of four political parties 




In the worldview of the Basque Patriotic Left, ETA’s campaign is merely a reflection of a larger, 
primordial conflict between the Basque nation and the French and (especially) the Spanish state. 
Under this perspective, ETA’s violence was merely a reaction to the perceived repression that 
the Basque people suffered for centuries at the hands of the Spanish state; such thinking is 
encapsulated in the following extract from a 2012 statement by the ETA Prisoners Collective 
(EPPK):  
‘The present conflict has violated the rights of our nation. Now is the 500th anniversary of the 
occupation of Basque Country and the 75
th
 anniversary of the bombing of Guernica. France and 
Spain continue with their repression’.35 
This statement is merely a continuation of the traditional discourse that ETA has espoused in its 
public communiqués: the notion that they were forced to engage in an armed struggle as a 
response to political repression, absence of freedoms and other similar justifications. As 
Domínguez emphasises, in ETA’s discourse ‘murderers become victims, even the primary 
victims, because they are forced into doing something they do not want to’.36 
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Furthermore ETA’s attacks are regarded by the BPL as simply part of a continuum of violence 
that involves the actions of both state and non-state actors and each party is perceived as being 
equally responsible for the conflict.
37
 The use of the term ‘conflict’ is far from neutral and highly 
contested as it implies that the state did not act in a legal and democratic manner as evidenced by 
the state-sponsored activities of the GAL terrorist group in the 1980s. Importantly, the framings 
of the ‘conflict’ and the ‘moral equivalence of all violence(s)’ provides not only an a-historical 
pretext to ETA’s actions but are leveraged politically to justify ETAs violence. Indeed, an 
essential implication of these claims is that the only effective tool to resolve such atavistic 




On the contrary, victims and peace groups have long argued that the BPL generates such 
rhetorical frames in order to justify and legitimise ETA’s violence. As an illustration, one 
participant criticised the BPL’s tactic of describing ETA inmates as ‘political prisoners’ or 
‘Basque prisoners’ as a barely disguised attempt at creating a mental association in which 
members of the terrorist organisation are implied to be in jail not due to their involvement in 
violence but merely by being Basque or by espousing certain ideology.
39
 
They also criticise the attempt by the BPL to blur the boundaries around who can be considered a 
victim by creating an all-encompassing category that includes all individuals impacted by the 
violence, meaning not only those who suffered police abuses and state terrorism but ETA 
members convicted by the Spanish judiciary. By defining ETA prisoners as ‘victims of the 
conflict’ the BPL blurs the distinction between innocent victims and perpetrators, and for the 
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victims groups in Spain, this results in re-victimisation leading to further suffering for victims 
and their families. 
The process can be described as one of competitive victimhood, a common theme in this special 
issue.
40
 Indeed, the notion that ‘members of groups involved in violent conflict seek to establish 
that their group has suffered more than their adversarial group’ is very relevant here.41 Whereas 
the work of Spanish victims associations acts as a reminder of the suffering caused by militant 
organisations within the country, BPL members contend that they themselves represent a 
victimised community.  Their claim is that the Basque people, a nation whom they claim to 
represent, have suffered unjustly from centuries of Spanish repression and, as such, little has 
changed from the transition from the Francoist dictatorship to a democratic government. As they 
regard themselves as having suffered equally or more than ETA’s targets they are less likely to 
experience and display empathy towards the victims of their own violence.  
Participants in this study contend that there is an absence of self-criticism within the BPL; there 
is still no honest ethical and moral renunciation of ETA’s violence. At most, such violence is 
seen as tactically counter-productive but not morally wrong since it was justified as a response to 
the Spanish and French states’ counter-terror policies, which they described as repression. 
Hence, the BPL is described as now seeking to achieve their political goals through a change of 
tactics, with no reflection on the violence used in the past.  
Most importantly for the subject of this analysis, in order to push its own narrative the Basque 
Patriotic Left has engaged since the 1990s in high-level international mobilisation. This includes 
several meetings with political groups at the European and national parliaments (including 
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Westminster), international party conferences and intense propaganda work online in influential 
websites such as Wikipedia.
42
 In these exchanges ETA militants have been described as 
‘freedom fighters’ and the Spanish government as anti-democratic and at war with the Basque 
Country. Furthermore the BPL has, over the years, built strong relationships with paramilitary 
groups’ political wings, such as the Sinn Fein and the Kurdish BDP. This relationship involves 
exchange of knowledge and resources between actors, as well as engagement around negotiation 
options with governments and the rights of prisoners.
43
 
The BPL has engaged in this international effort to construct credible narrative frames reinforced 
through external validation, but also to pressurise the Spanish government into negotiations with 
ETA, resulting in what they hope will be a dignified end for what can reasonably described as an 
exhausted and unpopular militant organisation. These three elements are closely inter-connected 
since describing ETA’s violence as a reflection of an ethnic conflict between Basques and 
Spanish –a claim that waves away the fact that the vast majority of the Basques traditionally 
reject ETA’s violence- strengthens the case for the use of negotiations that would provide ETA 
with a last chance to snatch political gains in spite of the failure of their military campaign.  
The actions of victims and political groups in their attempts to challenge the narrative of ETA 
and associated groups on the international stage, are described by the participants in this study as 
counter narrative and violence prevention initiatives. Their intention is to promote a discourse 
about ETA that is understood and shared internationally and for that it is essential to dismantle 
the romanticised view that exists of ETA as freedom fighters in a legitimate bi-directional 
conflict.  
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‘The account that the victims associations want to deliver in the international sphere is that this 
‘conflict’ has never existed, the victims are innocent people who have exercised their freedom of 
expression and due to the fact that their views did not coincide with the political tenets of the 
terrorist organisation ETA, they have been murdered, they have been extorted… Therefore , 
rather than using the freedom of speech that the Spanish Constitution guarantees, they [ETA 
members] have resorted to violence to prevent innocent citizens from exercising their own 
rights.’44 
‘Since 2002, 2003, even before the 11-M […] we realised that it was necessary to leave Spain to 
tell the testimony of the victims of terrorism and to play them off against existing distortions and 
a mythology that existed in certain contexts about what terrorism, the history of terrorism and 
terrorism victimisation meant’45 
It is also important for them to challenge facile comparisons that exist between the Basque and 
Northern Ireland contexts:  
‘[At one academic event that the group organised] we invited experts on the fight against 
terrorism from Northern Ireland. We tried to establish a link with Northern Ireland because the 
BPL continuously tries to match the Northern Irish process with the terrorism suffered in Basque 
Country even if they are complete different realities’.46 
They remind others that unlike Northern Ireland, ETA’s violence in the Basque Country is not 
part of a broader conflict and, also in contrast to Northern Ireland, this did not occur in a divided 
society. Victims of ETA’s violence refused to radicalise in response to their experience, and 
point out that they rejected individual retaliation whilst supporting the rule of law. They also 
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contend that ETA was a minority project and that the large majority of Basque society mobilised 
first against Franco and then ETA, in support of the existing democratic system.
47
 So rather than 
a fight between Basques and Spanish, the roots of the violence are in the actions of a militant 
group supported by a movement pursuing a political project rejected by a large majority of the 
Basques. It was the Basques themselves who suffered the violence first hand and it was the 
Basque people who opposed the violence in a peaceful manner all the while acting in support of 
the existing democratic system. As a result, victims groups are resolutely against negotiations 
between the Spanish government and ETA since such a move would ultimately reward and 
legitimate ETA’s past actions.        
Essentially, in the case of Spain what we are witnessing is a ‘battle of narratives’ played out at 
the international level but for fundamentally domestic reasons. The battle of narratives described 
here is a struggle to determine which of the two competing frames becomes predominant 
internationally. In it, victims and peace groups have recognised the importance of challenging a 
discourse that advocates for a specific framing of the past that justifies violence and does so in 
order to shape the future of Basque politics; simultaneously the discourse focuses on the personal 
identity of victims of terrorism and how this is understood both nationally and internationally. 
Effectiveness and future challenges   
Crucially, and despite the persistence and innovation demonstrated by victims groups in Spain, 
they believe that they are losing the battle to control the narrative.  
In part this is because, according to members of these associations, Spanish political authorities 
are either unaware of the problem or refuse to address it. Jihadist radicalisation has become a 
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priority and producing an accurate counter narrative that challenges the legitimacy of the 
violence carried out by ETA has been largely ignored by the Spanish government. Despite the 
best efforts of victims and associated advocacy groups in Spain,
48
 the lack of substantive 
political action by Basque and Spanish political parties is regarded as having facilitated the 
international spread of the BPL’s message. As a result some victims organisations explain their 
involvement in violence prevention and counter narrative work as means to fill in the gap that the 
absence of institutional action has created.  
Victims’ representatives also believe that the successes achieved by the BPL in pushing their 
own narrative benefits from a lack of detailed knowledge abroad regarding the Basque Country’s 
violent past. The problem is that a glorified view of ETA still persists in some places and their 
actions become more abstract the further the observer resides from the violence and its effects.
49
 
Some worry that this view is so entrenched that it is now very hard to change.
50
 This was evident 
in the views of international rapporteurs who have approached the problem from the vantage 
point of the BPL discourse: ‘when the human right rapporteurs arrived at the Basque Country 
they came with an attitude very biased towards ETA’.51 
In explaining their opponents’ success, participants also highlight the fact that the BPL is much 
better resourced to push their own message outside their borders than they themselves are. In 
short, there is a massive gap between the financial resources of one side and the other. Whereas 
the BPL can divert for this purpose the generous public funding that comes from being a political 
party, associations must rely on shoestring budgets.  
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So, when asked about how to narrow the existing gap between the BPL and the victim groups, 
some interviewees emphasised the importance of public funding. Although this is qualified by 
noting that their international action does not in fact require substantial injection of money, there 
is a shared perception that much could be achieved with few resources. At the same time, it is 
often argued that they should be allowed to work independently without interference by political 
parties.  There is a call for greater political will but at the same time a reminder that that their 
work should not become politicised and distorted by established political parties’ interests. 
Interestingly, greater and closer collaboration amongst victims associations is not generally seen 
as a mechanism that would improve their effectiveness in this battle of narratives. This is 
puzzling given that pooling resources seems a potential avenue for addressing the problem of 
limited funding that exists across the board. Such reluctance might be due to a number of factors: 
differences in perspectives or strategies, personality clashes amongst leaders or even competition 
for ever-shrinking funding. Although the above is speculative at this stage, we do know that all 
of these issues have existed in the past and although victims’ groups have generally presented a 
common front on important questions and they do broadly share a common discourse, it is also a 
heterogeneous community and ideological differences exist between -and even within- 
associations.     
A related problem is that, on the one hand, the portrayal of ETA’s terrorism as a ‘national 
liberation struggle’ is a long-term strategy single-mindedly pursued by the BPL over four 
decades. In contrast, the view that ETA’s terrorism was morally wrong has been traditionally 
shared by a large majority of Basques citizens,
52
ranging from politically moderate nationalists to 
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conservative and leftist non-nationalists. Such ideological heterogeneity amongst ETAs 
opponents does however tend to hinder common discursive action even if the rejection of ETA’s 
legitimacy is amply shared:      
‘They [the BPL] have resources, they have a strategy and they have a goal. We don’t have 
resources nor strategy and no permanent objectives. They work tightly together because they are 
more sectarian, they have a clear vision. We ourselves must deal with the existing democratic 
plurality and shared interests’53 
It has been mentioned in the previous section that, following their permanent ceasefire, ETA 
ceased to be a key priority for the Spanish government. This is also true for Basque citizens 
themselves, whose main concerns at the time of writing are a weak economy and unemployment. 
Amongst some of the interviewees there is the perception that Basque society as a whole is too 
passive because most Basques are relieved about the end of ETA’s violence and now simply 
desire to move on:  
‘the rest of society, who obviously never supported the violence or the BPL, is not bothered, it is 
not a priority. They turn the page, as we say, without reading it. [..] 80% of the population can’t 
be bothered’ 54 
The BPL, a highly mobilised, radicalised minority who supported the perpetrators in the past are 
opposed by another activist sector (victims groups) but this occurs amongst the compromising 
apathy of a silent majority:  
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‘My own view is that people wish to turn the page, live a quiet life and not to be bothered with 
this.  This is a struggle between specific socio-political actors in which we the victims want 
memory, justice and truth and other actors wish to justify certain acts to get the etarras quickly 
out of jail, close the chapter and gain power, no? That their bloody past would not stain their 
present and future.  That is the struggle, no? And in between there is a society who does not feel 
nor suffer [..] society is just waiting to see who wins. As always.’55 
They worry that the haste in which Basque society wishes to turn the page on the past may have 
consequences for the future: 
‘It appears that ETA is not active any more, even if it still exists, and that all this is in the past 
and people want to turn the page but what we say is that some people want to turn the page 
without reading the book. And I believe that the page needs to be turned after reading it well and 
to close this as it should be closed’.56 
The priority, in other words, is to avoid the temptation to turn to the future too fast whilst failing 
to engage in a critical analysis of the past.
57
 The pernicious consequences that may result from 
the BPL successfully framing ETA as a liberation movement are yet to be seen. From the 
perspective of the victims, the truth needs to be told to prevent future generations glorifying 
ETA’s violence.  
The victims see it as essential to educate the public about the pain and suffering that ETA caused 
in order to produce a cautionary tale for Basque youth on the futility of terrorism. This concern is 
far from unfounded: a 2009 report by the Basque Parliament Office of the Ombudsman reported 
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In effect, the struggle for memory is therefore seen as a mechanism to construct a better, more 
peaceful society: ‘We do this for the future generations [..] We are building the memory [..] and 
a dignified peace that is built on the principles of memory, truth and justice’59 That their 
activism is not for their own benefit but for Basque society as a whole can be expressed with the 
concept of ‘altruism born of suffering’; the idea that individuals who have been victimised may 
devote themselves to help others ‘not only despite their difficult experiences but precisely 
because of them’.60 Such pro-social behaviour can be manifest in political campaigning and 
transformative efforts aimed at social change as evidenced in the social movements literature.
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Clearly, and as noted in the introduction, a victim-perpetrator cycle is not universal: victimhood 
can be channelled instead into peace efforts and the promotion of non-violence.       
Thus, the victims support organisations’ argument is that, by bringing the past to the present with 
a strong emotional underpinning, memorialisation has the potential to represent not only an 
effective counter-narrative by de-mystifying political violence but also an alternative narrative as 
it reinforces democratic norms and values against intolerance and fanaticism. Memorialisation 
can therefore be a foundation for peaceful coexistence because it promotes ethical and moral 
principles and the respect for individual human rights. In a 2013 publication, the head of 
Fundación Fernando Buesa himself further elaborated on this claim:  
‘an end to terrorism without memory, without ethic, social, and political delegitimisation, and 
with a subculture of fear and fanaticism that still survives in some sectors within Basque society 
means the preservation of the embers that would rekindle the flames of the past with a strong 
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wind in times of drought. This is what is at stake these days: the future, not of this generation, 
but future ones’.62 
In summary, for the victims groups, a strong democratic coexistence is founded on, firstly, an 
ethical memory serving as a response to intolerance and, secondly, a conscious effort to 
delegitimise violence that is integral to the broader objective of the protection of individual rights 
and the strengthening of a culture of peace. In this respect, international activities are merely a 
continuation of those carried out within Basque Country, embodied in the plan for a Victims 
Memorial Centre. As argued in its expert committee report:  
‘The Memorial Centre will have as mission not only to promote justice, dignity and the memory 
of the victims of these barbaric acts but also a democratic culture that examines the “ideological” 
roots of terrorism and its illegitimate violence to unmask its moral or theoretical trappings and 
delegitimise it ideologically […] Only by highlighting past injustices, we can build a less unjust 
present, only emphasising past violence we’ll build a future without violence’.63 
Conclusion  
As evidenced in the analysis above it is clear that a number of Spanish victims’ associations have 
worked tirelessly to give a voice to the victims of terrorism and broadcast their testimonies (‘el 
relato’) to national and international audiences. These groups believe that  the stories and 
insights of the victims can illustrate the human costs of terrorism and, by appealing to the 
emotional instincts of their target audiences, become an essential tool to challenge and counter 
extremist propaganda that promotes violence.  
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The present international context of global jihadism and the prioritisation of terrorism prevention 
by Western governments as a response has opened a window of opportunity for Spanish victims 
organisations to contribute to efforts organised by international actors. These programmes have 
provided a lease of life, another raison d'etre and/or a renewed sense of direction for those groups 
whose primary aims are political.  
Yet even if these initiatives have been presented in a changing international landscape under the 
framework of CVE, much of this work has a domestic focus. Indeed, a key goal behind this drive 
has been to challenge the international legitimisation of ETA; testimonies by their victims can 
turn the spotlight on the dramatic costs that their acts have had on the constituencies they claim 
to represent. In doing so these associations have engaged in a battle of narratives with the Basque 
Patriotic Left as they confront the BPLs long-term strategy of exporting their own discourse. As 
we have seen, such a battle of narratives is rooted in competitive notions of victimhood.  
For these groups, it is essential that a skewed view of the past does not take hold: the concern is 
that if ETA becomes idealised as a national liberation movement, it would transmute into a myth 
fabricated to encourage future generations to take up arms. This consideration is supported by 
existing academic work on how romanticised fantasies about terrorist organisations facilitates 
recruitment and helps to sustain involvement in their activities.
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As such, this is violence prevention through delegitimisation. On the one hand, testimonies that 
demonstrate civilian suffering at the hands of militants can work as a counter-narrative to 
deconstruct and de-mystify extremist messages. In addition to de-glamorising terrorist attacks 
perpetrated against ordinary civilians, victims’ messages can act as an alternative narrative: there 
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is a strong belief within these groups about the importance of educating the youth on democratic 
values and tolerance to prevent a recurrence of violence. The ultimate aim thus is to challenge 
the glorification of violent extremism through memorialisation of the victims and education for 
the youth on democratic values; by laying out the historical consequences of politically 
motivated violence the victims organisations believe that these aims can be achieved.  
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